Racism: On the phenomenology of embodied desocialization by Michael Staudigl
Racism: On the phenomenology of embodied
desocialization
Michael Staudigl
Published online: 23 December 2011
 The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper addresses racism from a phenomenological viewpoint. Its
main task is, ultimately, to show that racism as a process of ‘‘negative socialization’’
does not amount to a contingent deficiency that simply disappears under the con-
ditions of a fully integrated society. In other words, I suspect that racism does not
only indicate a lack of integration, solidarity, responsibility, recognition, etc.; rather,
that it is, in its extraordinary negativity, a socially constitutive phenomenon per se.
After suggesting phenomenology’s potential to tackle the question of racism, I will
focus on the experiential oppressiveness of racism, i.e., the ways in which it affects
its victims’ lived experiences, in transforming their habitual ways of life and,
finally, their subjectivities. My major thesis is that racism works via both inter-
kinaesthetically as well as symbolically inflicted distortions of the victim’s body
schema. As such a process of ‘‘negative socialization,’’ racism, however, influences
the embodied self-conception of the oppressor, who finds himself compelled to
adhere to some kind of invisible norm such as, e.g., ‘‘whiteness.’’
Keywords Racism  Phenomenology  Embodiment  Symbolic Institution 
Desocialization
1 Introduction
We had better courageously face the fact that prejudices are themselves
elements of the interpretation of the social world and even one of the
mainsprings that make it tick. Prejudices are rationalizations and institution-
alizations of the underlying ‘central myth’ upon which the self-interpretation
of the group is founded. It makes little sense to tell the Negrophobe in the
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South that in terms of biological science there is no such thing as a Negro
race.1
What makes Schutz’s insight, which he formulates in his 1955 essay ‘‘Equality
and the Social Meaning Structure,’’ philosophically remarkable is that it not only
considers the negativity of a specific type of social action with unusual acuity, but
also recognizes such negativity as the social action’s very ‘‘mainspring.’’ With this
in mind, in this paper, I seek to analyze ‘‘racism’’ as a phenomenon of ‘‘negative
sociality’’ and, thereby, to view it from a socio-phenomenological perspective. Such
a project requires three crucial preliminary considerations. First, it is necessary to
reflect on what I understand by ‘‘negative sociality.’’ Second—taking into account
the insights of more recent studies—I will foreground what I do not want to
understand by racism. In the light of these reflections, it should become clear from
the outset why I view racism as an exemplary phenomenon of ‘‘negative sociality.’’
Third, I will address, in brief, why I consider phenomenology suitable for an
analysis of racism as being such a phenomenon.
Following these preliminary considerations, in the main section of my paper, I
will turn to the analysis of the phenomenon itself. In doing so, I am not concerned,
however, with tracing the concrete historical manifestations of racism. Rather, my
analysis will center on, to my mind, the invariant methods, which characterize
racism as a specific form of social practice (or ‘‘social technology’’) that exploits our
dependency upon bodily identifications. Following Hund, these methods could be
aptly described as ‘‘negative socialization,’’2 which are of identity-relevance not
only for those subjected to them, but also for those that ‘‘employ’’ them. Drawing on
concrete phenomenological descriptions, I aim to exhibit these methods by way of
examples, two of which I shall focus on.
In the concluding section, I seek to clarify, at least in outline, whether and to
what extent racism can be understood as an irreducible phenomenon of ‘‘negative
sociality’’ and how such an understanding of racism bears on the way in which it is
dealt with socially.
2 Three preliminary considerations
(a) The expression ‘‘negative sociality’’ appears, at first, eminently problematic.
Indeed, it seems to speak directly to the suspicion ‘‘that […] negative
experiences [such as mistrust, discrimination, contempt, or violence] cannot
be cancelled out by a community or a society that is characterized by
responsibility, justice, and recognition.’’ If this were the case, then we
would be faced with the necessity fundamentally to revise these concepts,
and eventually even the concept of the social itself. For according to the
thesis deduced thereof, the social, under these conditions, can ‘‘not be
1 Schutz (1976, p. 272).
2 On this concept see Hund (2006).
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consistently brought under the rule of law or be pacified by the rules of
coexistence.’’3
From this follows that the focus must rest on negativity—i.e., concretely
lived ‘‘negative experiences’’—in terms of its irreducibility or indissolubility
in ‘‘social life’’ itself and on the coherence and intelligibility related to it.
Thus the term ‘‘negativity’’ does not refer to a phenomenon of contingent
deficiency that could be caught up with discursively, mediated dialectically,
or overcome procedurally—to name but a few approaches to coping with
contingency. Negativity does not merely amount to a contingent deficiency
of justice, trust, responsibility, communalization, solidarity, communication,
and so on, as tends to be assumed by the mainstream of social philosophy,
where it is at all sensitive to this issue. Whether a philosophical perspective
assumes that such ‘‘negative experiences’’ can be countered by a unity that
is to be realized through harmony, universality, concordia, homonoia, the
‘‘reciprocity of perspectives,’’ the ‘‘non-violent discourse,’’ or the ‘‘ideal
communication society,’’ whilst a political perspective opposes them to the
ideals of a fully integrated society or an organic community, under the
unifying force of which such negativity should simply dissolve: In all these
cases, negativity is presented as relative, as pure deficiency or as an
‘‘exception in social functioning,’’4 i.e., as ‘‘socially anomalous, as unusual,
an individual aberration or institutional hangover.’’5
In contrast, I suggest that it is indeed necessary that negativity be
understood as a ‘‘factum’’ in the sense of the Kantian ‘‘factum of reason,’’
which cannot be sublated into a more comprehensive legal or political
order. It cannot be sublated because it is extraordinary in respect to this
order. To conceive of negativity in its extraordinariness, however, also
entails a reflection on its order-constitutive function. For orders (re)generate
through exclusion and selection—through the production of an extra-
ordinary. Thus, just as there is order, there is also violence. In particular,
there is the violent character of order itself, to the extent to which it
always functions on a selective and exclusive basis, i.e., to the extent to
3 This approach is proposed by Hetzel, Liebsch and Sepp in their introduction to a forthcoming volume
on ‘‘Profile negativistischer Sozialphilosophie.’’
4 Terkessidis (2004, p. 8).
5 Goldberg of course critically opposes this view: ‘‘The prevailing view concerning contemporary racism
is that it is something that belongs to the past. Where it is taken to occur at all, it is considered as socially
anomalous, as unusual, an individual aberration or institutional hangover placed in check as soon as its
occurrence is noticed. Anyone extending to racist expression a greater place in contemporary culture than
this picture warrants is bound to be considered paranoid—or (as the current charge would have it)
politically correct’’ (Goldberg 1993, p. viii).
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which it excludes the extraordinary by including it.6 Thus, within order
there inheres a constitutive moment of negativity. This moment, however, is
not contingent because it renders possible the order’s accomplishment of
order (and therefore provides identity-relevant motivations to act). There-
fore, it is imperative to recognize that in its extraordinariness and
indissolubility, negativity plays a constitutive role for the accomplishment
of social order—and thus concretely for socialization. This implies that the
aforementioned phenomena of ‘‘negative sociality’’ are, on the one hand,
social phenomena through and through, while, on the other, they negate the
facticity of the social in-between, the horizon within which we tend to
think. Phenomena of ‘‘negative sociality’’ bear de-socializing effects and
remind us of the limits of socialization and communality,7 whilst at the
same time remaining socially overdetermined and tied to concrete social
action in their effectiveness.
(b) For a considerable time, research on racism has attempted to demonstrate that
it would be more felicitous to speak not of racism, but of racisms.8 As shown
by several analyses, the reference to the concept of ‘‘race’’ is by no means
constitutive for the historical manifestations of racism. Rather, the differen-
tiation of this concept is married to diverse social–historical contexts; as a
consequence, ‘‘race’’ has to be viewed as a ‘‘social construct.’’9 At the same
time, the opposite view has been put forth arguing for a ‘‘racism without
races,’’10 i.e., a racism that succeeds culturalistically without any longer
requiring the concept of race to this end. As a result of these insights, a
distinction has consistently been drawn between racisms of ‘‘race,’’ and those
within class, gender, and nationality,11 which on their part rely on ideological,
religious, or culturalistic discourses of legitimization. At stake in all these
6 This point concerns the self-preservation of factual order in terms of apparently legitimate violence
against the imminent threat of disorder, i.e., by invoking a generic gap—or even a mythic struggle—
between rationality and violence. Waldenfels explains this as follows: ‘‘By stigmatizing the criminal as
pure malfeasant, the political rebel as pure criminal, the enemy as ‘underman,’ or underdog, a good
conscience is preserved in a society that nolens volens does violence to others. The representatives of
society defend themselves, refusing even answers to their enemies. The law creates ‘outlaws’ without
questioning what kind of ‘out’ this is. The justification of violence is compensated for by the self-
righteousness of reason, which cedes to its own violence the more this process is disguised by
rationalization’’ (Waldenfels 1991, p. 108). For a more detailed account on the selective and exclusionary
functions of order, see Bauman (1991) and Waldenfels (1996).
7 An early reflection on the ‘‘limits of community’’ is provided by Plessner (1999).
8 Already since the 1970s, such a plurality has been acknowledged by researchers such as Stuart Hall,
Etienne Balibar, Robert Miles, Patrick Girard, and others. For an excellent overview, see Garner (2009).
9 See the exemplary discussion in Banton (1998, pp. 196–235). Amongst the first ones to clearly state this
idea, Omi and Winant (1986, pp. 61–68) developed a ‘‘theory of racial formation’’ that ‘‘emphasizes the
social nature of race, the absence of any racial characteristics, the historical flexibility of racial meanings
and categories, the conflictual character of race at both the ‘micro-’ and ‘macro-social’ levels, and the
irreducible political aspect of racial dynamics’’ (ibid., p. 4).
10 Balibar and Wallerstein (1991, p. 21).
11 See, e.g., Hund (2007, pp. 15–20). In this article, I will not touch upon the crucial question whether
these distinctions result in a conceptual inflation of the concept of racism.
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cases, there is—and at least until here, the minimum consensus seems to
reach—‘‘a process of the social construction of purportedly natural inequal-
ity,’’ which is an attempt ‘‘to find a natural explanation for social
differences.’’12 As a hegemonic scheme of explanation, racism therefore
always also mirrors the power relations that shape the integrity of societies
internally and externally. In contrast to social discrimination, which ‘‘struc-
tures individuals within the social context according to hierarchical contrasts,’’
racism—taken in the broadest sense—posits these individuals ‘‘as others
outside of the social context, in robbing them of their social particularity, or
denying their ability for it.’’13 In this vein, racism functions as a motive or a
means of threat for social integration or exclusion on the one hand, and
assimilation or segregation on the other. This dual direction of the impact of
racist processes of socialization, which as a result works on the basis of a dual
logic of ‘‘including exclusion’’ and ‘‘excluding inclusion,’’ is—to my mind—
constitutive for the phenomenon.
In accordance with what has been stated so far, I understand racism as a social
process of hetero-normative meaning-constitution,14 which holds out the
prospect of an illusory sense of community through bodily desocializing others
and thus charts identity-relevant motivations for actions for those who seek to
belong to this imagined community. What vary in the history of racism are the
legitimization patterns of these processes and the practices of exclusion that
substantiate them. It may therefore be the case that ‘‘ideal–typical construc-
tions’’ fail to grasp the diversity and heterogeneity of racist practices. They do
seem comparable, however, insofar as they ‘‘construct the others’’—within
society as well as outside of it—‘‘as deficient beings and locate them beyond
all respective social dualisms.’’15 From this insight follows moreover that
[t]he achievement of identity at the expense and to the detriment of others
does not only generate different degrees of being human, but also destabilizes
the very context that it founds. At the same time as the border to inferiority is
maintained outwardly, it is drawn into the very inner of society in form of a
flexible predetermined breakage point.16
Thus it follows that as a form of ‘‘negative socialization,’’ racism must be
viewed as an exemplary phenomenon of negative sociality because it is not
only a negating social practice, but also makes us aware of the negativity of the
social itself, i.e., the social violence that is an integral part of its constitution.
(c) Can phenomenology, then, make a contribution to an analysis of racism as a
process of ‘‘negative socialization’’—an undoubtedly historical process, into
12 Hund (2007, p. 35), see Delacampagne (2005, p. 60).
13 Hund (2006, p. 124).
14 I take the concept of ‘‘heteronormativity’’ from the context of gender studies, see esp. Ingraham
(1994).
15 Hund (2006, p. 124).
16 Hund (2006, p. 123).
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which flow concrete material foundations, structural forms of social organi-
zation, and ideological justifications? On the assumption that racism, or to
speak with R. Miles, ‘‘racializations’’ are in many cases processes of
‘‘meaning-constitution’’17 that are transmitted on a pre-reflexive level and that
carry with them identity-relevant choices of identification or experiences of
exclusion, a phenomenological—or, more precisely, a socio-phenomenolog-
ical—approach to analysis seems fitting. A closer look reveals two reasons
supporting my assertion. The first concerns the specificity of the subject
matter—violence or a relation of violence—, the second relates to the specific
methodology of phenomenological analysis.
1. The practice of phenomenology allows for what, following Husserl, we
could designate as an ‘‘ethical epoche´.’’18 I understand the task of such an
epoche´ to be the bracketing of all those discourses on the reasons and the
justifications of violence, in the normatively overdetermined (and
oftentimes moralizing) light of which the analysis of direct violence and
indirect relations of violence—both implied by racism—has to a large
extent taken place hitherto. Thus, phenomenology must seek to thematize
the conditions of possibility of violence and relations of violence; it must
focus on what is responsible for rendering such—in this case racist—
violence possible in the first case, and must ask how what is identified can
then subsequently become the subject of discourses of justification.19 In
this, it emerges as necessary that a phenomenology of racist violence—
and respectively, a phenomenology of violence in general—get to the
bottom of those processes of desensibilization that precede all direct
violence. Focusing their structure, pre-reflective functioning, and genesis,
a phenomenology of violence intends to show how subjects grow
indifferent to the suffering of others, and that they can hence no longer
perceive the singularity of their ‘‘ethical demand.’’20
2. Here, the second reason for my choice of the phenomenological approach
becomes perspicuous: it is the only approach that is in a position to steer
clear of the nominalistic and essentialist misinterpretations of the
phenomenon, in order to trace, conversely, the effective reality of
racializations in the everydayness of lived experience, personal habitu-
alities, and the institutions of our life-world.21 This implies, more
concisely, that so-called ‘‘meaning-constitutions’’ can be comprehensively
17 In his works on racism as social practice and ideology, Robert Miles has focussed on the various
interconnected ‘‘processes of signification and representation’’ that constitute ‘‘race’’ as a social
attribution (see Miles 1989, pp. 69–98).
18 Husserl (1959, p. 319).
19 On the issue of the ambiguity of the legitimization of violence see Waldenfels (1991).
20 As has been shown by Levinas in his essay ‘‘Useless Suffering,’’ the reason for this lies in an
ontologization of violence, which defines violence as an ‘‘ontological perversion’’ because of its
inevitability—which, however, by no means excludes its minimization—as well as likening it to ‘‘the
useless suffering that springs from natural plagues’’ (Levinas 1998, p. 95). As regards collective violence,
I provide an account of this process of desensibilization in Staudigl (2011).
21 See Alcoff (2005, pp. 173–194).
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reconstructed neither in reference to the motives of a self-reflective subject
capable of acting instrumentally nor in taking recourse to structures by
which actions are functionally governed. Rather, I would suggest, the
focus must lie on those pre-reflective dimensions of lived experience that
predetermine the habitus of our experiencing, and interactions in a bodily
manner—i.e., in this context, which permeate it with racism or, more
precisely, ‘‘racialize’’ it and, hence, make overt racist violence possible.
Thus in terms of methodology, I consider the phenomenological approach
suitable insofar as it admits for the illumination of the interplay between
different registers of experience in their identity-relevance. Without
elaborating this thought any further here, I propose to understand the
meaning-constitution and therefore subject-constitution as the interplay
between subjective sense-bestowal, anonymous processes of sense-
formation, and symbolic institution. The ‘‘open and indefinite unity of
subjectivity’’ thus emerges, to follow Merleau-Ponty, in correlation with
the ‘‘open unity of the world,’’ the ‘‘autochthonous significance’’22 of
which essentially determines its genesis. In viewing meaning-constitution
and self-constitution as such a relational and basically inter-corporeal
occurrence, a phenomenology thus transforms into a theory of culture on
its own accord. Ultimately, it is only in the latter’s light that phenom-
enology is able to zoom in adequately on the efficiency previously
mentioned, i.e., on the performative force and apparent magic of culturally
overdetermined nexuses of sense, and respectively, of hegemonic regimes
of sense-formation (such as the concept of race or the pseudo-scientific
discourse on race).23
3 On the phenomenology of racist ‘‘methods’’
Thus, the direction of the impact of a phenomenological recourse to lived
experience is clearly determined. Yet, does it not, in the same gesture, confront us
with a dire problem? Does it not delineate a phenomenology that can no longer rely
on the undeniable meaningfulness of the social world, but rather encounters the
incompossible, the resistance of which undermines the ‘‘sheltering canopies’’ of our
‘‘symbolic universes’’24? Do not at least two mutually irreducible starting points of a
reflection on the sense of violence offer themselves to such a pursuit? Whose
experience is at stake here? Is it not either a ‘‘phenomenology of the oppressor’’25 as
Sartre proposed, or a phenomenology of ‘‘suffered violence,’’ hence a
22 Merleau-Ponty (2009, pp. 473, 512).
23 This is not the place for me to further develop the here mentioned phenomenological theory of culture,
which I believe to hinge on the concept of ‘‘symbolic institution’’ (institution symbolique). The works of
Marc Richir offer a systematic meditation on this potential of phenomenological research (see esp. Richir
1988; Tengelyi 2007).
24 See Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 120).
25 Sartre (1992, p. 561).
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phenomenology of the experience of the victim of racist discrimination or violence?
And matters seem to get even more complicated: From a phenomenological
standpoint, are we not required also to consider the perspectives of a third party, be
it actual (such as witnesses, followers, bystanders, ‘‘uninvolved observers’’) or
virtual (for instance, one’s conscience as the ‘‘innermost form of otherness,’’ or the
apparent universality of the law). For after all, the third party’s presence or absence
and intervention or passivity is, without doubt, of decisive importance for the
genesis of the respective contexts of experience and their identity-relevant
implications. To sum up my argument: Is the category of sense—the category of
phenomenology and hermeneutics—at all suitable to cope with the structural
difference, which patently seems to separate violence as an intention and violence as
an experience that befalls us (to refrain here from a discussion of violence as a
‘‘second-order construct’’)?26
Despite the irreducibility, on which it insists, this problem appears to me to be
only a pseudo-problem. For ‘‘the experience of the other’’—to use a Husserlian
concept—is relational through and through; social phenomena are ‘‘phenomena of
the in-between,’’ to use the language of Bernhard Waldenfels. The experience of the
other is endowed with a sense, which ‘‘occurs between me and the other, between
what is my own and what is foreign to me.’’ More precisely, it possesses a sense,
which can ‘‘neither be fully traced back to the initiative and the capacity of single
individuals or groups nor to a mediating authority of order nor to codified
regulations.’’27 To put it phenomenologically, it possesses a sense, which can
neither be entirely ascribed to the ego’s sense-bestowals nor explained as the result
of processes of ‘‘symbolic institution.’’ Neither is it a sense that emerges completely
behind the back of the active I. Rather, for its identity-relevant articulation, this
sense requires the transition through the historic-cultural ‘‘interworld’’ of human
symbolisms as well as the creative ‘‘re-ordering of fact and hazard.’’28
In other words, the experience of the other thus bears a sense that is only
articulated in the concrete intersubjective encounter, even though in this case—and
this point is crucial—it does not indicate a ‘‘reciprocity of perspectives,’’ which
would secure for us at least a minimal access to a shared world. On the contrary, it is
the concrete modality of racist practices, the mode in which it ‘‘addresses’’ others,
which precludes this possibility, i.e., de-subjectivizes, de-humanizes the other.
With great force, Frantz Fanon gives voice to this experience of de-subjectivized
subjectivization in the chapter ‘‘The Fact of Blackness’’ of his book Black Skin,
White Masks. To my mind, this is, in fact, one of the first times that the problem of
racism is described phenomenologically. Although it rests essentially on Sartre’s
26 On the here emerging difference between action-theoretical and definition-theoretical approaches, see
Hitzler (1999).
27 Waldenfels (2002, p. 174).
28 On this ‘‘interworld,’’ see Merleau-Ponty (1973, p. 200); on the ‘‘re-ordering,’’ which demonstrates




theory of a bodily being-for-others,29 Fanon, at the same time, also seeks to do
justice to the basic existential factum that is masked by Sartre: For the black man,
the white man is not simply ‘‘only The Other but also the master, whether real or
imaginary.’’30 Not only does the concrete failure of the dialectic of recognition that
is constitutive for Sartre’s approach become manifest thereby; with Fanon, further,
we are in the position to demonstrate that in the form of symbolically instituted
power-relations, this factum informs the habitus of bodily self-experience of the
‘‘racialized objects’’31 and is thus performatively reproduced.
The black man among his own in the twentieth century does not know at what
moment his inferiority comes into being through the Other… (…) And then
the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. An unfamiliar
weight burdened me. The real world challenged my claims. In the white world
the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily
schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activitiy. It is a third
person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain
uncertainty. I know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out my right
arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table. (…) And
all these movements are made not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge.
A slow composition of my self as a body in the middle of a spatial and
temporal world—such seems to be the schema. It does not impose itself on
me; it is, rather, a definitive structuring of the self and the world—definitive
because it creates a real dialectic between my body and the world.32
Following Fanon, the ‘‘body schema’’ that is referred to here, which Merleau-
Ponty thematized as the linchpin of the being-for-the-world mentioned earlier,
describes a merely superficial mode of experiencing lived embodiment. What Fanon
designates as the ‘‘historico-racial schema’’ underlies and structures it:
For several years certain laboratories have been trying to produce a serum for
‘‘denegrification;’’ with all the earnestness of the world, laboratories have
sterilized their test tubes, checked their scales, and embarked on researches
that might make it possible for the miserable Negro to whiten himself and thus
to throw off the burden of that corporeal malediction. Below the corporeal
schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The elements that I used had
been provided for me not by ‘‘residual sensations and perceptions primarily of
a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character,’’ but by the other, the
white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories.
29 As Sartre sums it up: ‘‘I exist my body: this is its first dimension of being. My body is utilized and
known by the Other: this is its second dimension. But insofar as I am for others, the Other is revealed to
me as the subject for whom I am an object. Even there the question […] is of my fundamental relation
with the Other. I exist therefore for myself as known by the Other—in particular in my very facticity. I
exist for myself as a body known by the Other. This is the third ontological dimension of my body.’’
(Sartre 2000, p. 351).
30 Fanon (1986, p. 138, note).
31 In this distinction, I am following Toni Morrison (1992, p. 90) who speaks of ‘‘racial subjects’’ and
‘‘racial objects.’’
32 Fanon (1986, pp. 110–111).
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I thought that what I had in hand was to construct a physiological self, to
balance space, to localize sensations, and here I was called on for more.33
The body schema as thematized by phenomenology seems, in this regard, to be the
schema of a body that is in the world with-itself, a body that lives in a pre-reflexive
balance with its surroundings, a body whose habitual performance knowledge is
lived unproblematically. The ‘‘white gaze’’ (which is, of course, never merely a gaze
nor simply white) racializes this schema. More precisely, it makes the one who is
gazed at aware that the schema was always already racialized. As a consequence, his
orientation in the world becomes questionable, the accessibility of certain objects
seems suddenly problematic, and—more generally—the body schema breaks down
to give room to a ‘‘racial epidermal schema.’’34 This schema forces itself upon the
perception of the social space and its institutions and organizes action in the light of a
‘‘retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already inhabited.’’35 The lived space as
such becomes white, in the sense of that ‘‘absent centre against which others appear
only as deviants, or points of deviation.’’36 The habitual incorporation of lived space
re-oriented in this vein thus creates ‘‘habit worlds’’ and leads to the ‘‘institution-
alization of a certain ‘likeness,’ which makes non-white bodies feel uncomfortable,
exposed, visible, different, when they take up this place.’’37 The ‘‘habitual body’’38
thus becomes the playing field for ‘‘symbolic violence,’’ i.e., a violence that functions
on basis of the pre-reflective embodiment of oppressive social power relations.
Precisely because of its pre-reflexivity, it is, however, not conceived as violence, but
rather succeeds in appearing as ‘‘naturally given.’’39
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends,
stories, history, and above all historicity, which I had learned about from
Jaspers. Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its
place taken by a racial epidermal schema. […]
I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors.
I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my
ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism,
intellectual deficiency, fetichism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all
else, above all: ‘‘Sho’ good eatin.’’ [Y a bon banania]40
The reflection on the so-called factum—i.e., on racism as a symbolically
transmitted and reproduced relation of domination that generates patterns of
33 Fanon (1986, p. 111).
34 Fanon (1986, p. 112). As the gaze is not the only means to mediate oppression and social violence, skin
colour is, of course, not the only anchoring point for bodily stigmatization. As a consequence, for a more
comprehensive analysis, the focus on the ‘‘white gaze’’ needs to be shifted to other ‘‘practices of
visibility’’ (Alcoff 2005, p. 8).
35 Ahmed (2007, p. 157).
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Merleau-Ponty (2009, p. 95).
39 On the concept of ‘‘symbolic violence,’’ see Bourdieu (2001, pp. 34–41).
40 Fanon (1986, p. 112).
32 M. Staudigl
123
interaction prone of violence—therefore brings something else to the fore,
something on which anti-racist discussions would only later begin to focus: the
insight that in correlation to the ‘‘symbolic violence’’ of racism mentioned already,
i.e., correlative to the symbolically embodied pre-formation of subjective action, the
room to maneuver for the interaction of the ‘‘racialized subjects’’ undergoes a pre-
formation too.41 Sartre became aware of this correlation subsequent to his first visit
to the USA in the year 1945, when he began to reflect upon the ‘‘invisibility of the
black gaze,’’42 a gaze that was unable to enter into the struggle for recognition at all.
Sartre realized that this imposed and habitually lived invisibility correlatively
required an effort on the part of those that were completely absorbed by ‘‘whiteness
as norm,’’43 whilst constantly living in fear of not meeting this norm44—a fear
which, as a consequence, became projected onto the Other.45
‘‘Look, a Negro!’’ It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed
by. I made a tight smile.
‘‘Look, a Negro!’’ It was true. It amused me.
‘‘Look, a Negro!’’ The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my
amusement. ‘‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!’’ Frightened! Frightened!
Now they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh
myself to tears, but laughter had become impossible.46
By focusing on the ‘‘lived experience of blackness,’’ Fanon’s descriptions also
provide decisive starting points for an analytics of the ‘‘racist subject.’’ It does so in
proffering evidence that ‘‘the Negro, because of his body, impedes the closing of the
postural schema of the white man’’47—which characterizes him as ‘‘the principle of
evil’’48 (of bad, impure, biological, sexual, etc.). Analogously, and in addition to the
central modalities of the experience of racism, his descriptions also enable us to
trace the central methods of racism, methods that have also been unearthed by
comparative historical studies.49 First, we come upon the experience of inferior-
ization through the attribution of cultural difference. Such attribution practices
employ a logic of mutual exclusion that is expressed in pairs of opposites such as
41 This also corresponds to Sartre’s approach in his Critique of Dialectical Reason, where Sartre employs
the concepts of the practico-inert and of seriality to thematize the responsibility—even the ‘‘categorical
imperative’’ (Sartre 1976a, p. 303, note)—of being-white.
42 See Sartre (1945); on this in more detail Bernasconi (1995).
43 See David (2001), who draws the connection between this ‘‘norm’’ of whiteness (ibid., p. 167) and the
metaphysics of ‘‘form,’’ which for occidental philosophy leads to the following decisive question:
‘‘Comment voire cela, la ‘couleur,’ comment acce´der au fait que la lumie`re n’est pas lumen naturale,
lumie`re naturelle, mais lumie`re blanchie ?’’ (Ibid., p. 168).
44 See, on the motif of anxiety, Stokes, who analyzes being-white as a ‘‘form of textual, political, and
sexual anxiety’’ (Stokes 2001, pp. 158–177); see also Dyer (1997, p. 44–45).
45 See for instance Young (1996). On the psychoanalytic motif of projection, see Fanon (1986, chapter
6); a systematic explication can be found in Kearney (2003).
46 Fanon (1986, pp. 111–112).
47 Fanon (1986, p. 160).
48 Fanon (1986, p. 190).
49 Hund (2007, pp. 82–119).
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culture/barbarism, civilization/savageness, purity/impurity, chosenness/fallenness or
significance/inferiority.50 This process of an inferiorizing positing of difference
represents a heteronormative form of socialization, which is ultimately based not
on—an always discriminating—inclusion, but in principle on segregation and
exclusion, i.e., it proceeds merely negatively. Secondly and closely linked to this is
the resulting experience of self-alienation, which can be traced back to desocial-
ization in principle as the objective inherent to inferiorization.51 The alienating
splitting of consciousness, i.e., the ‘‘doubling of personality’’ according to Sartre52
or the ‘‘double consciousness’’ in the sense of Du Bois,53 results from the self-
denigrating adoption of racist norms the fulfillment of which is impossible by
definition. The corresponding practices of desocialization are widespread and range
from the ‘‘denial of social particularization’’ to a fundamental ‘‘questioning of
cultural singularity.’’54 Finally and most crucially, Fanon makes us aware of
stigmatizing forms of embodiment that render possible and transmit desocialization
and inferiorization, and which thus must be retained as the third central method of
racism.
What has been said so far can, however, by no means only be demonstrated in the
context of the ‘‘infernal machine’’ of colonialism,55 which is, of course, of decisive
importance—from a historical perspective, for the genesis of a racial racism and
from a genealogical perspective, for subsequent national racism.56 Rather—to take a
big leap—we could say that it also becomes manifest in the affective micro-
practices of everyday racist interactions. To illustrate this point, I will refer to
Audre Lorde’s—practical-phenomenological—description of such an affectively
overdetermined situation of interbodily encounter in her Sister Outsider:
The AA subway train to Harlem. I clutch my mother’s sleeve, her arms full of
shopping bags, christmas-heavy. The wet smell of winter clothes, the train’s
lurching. My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snowsuited body
down. On one side of me a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a
fur hat staring at me. Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops
down, pulling mine with it. Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line where
my new blue snowpants and her sleek fur coat meet. She jerks her coat closer
50 See Hund (2007, pp. 121–126).
51 If inferiorization a` la limite is geared towards desocialization, then the distinction between two ‘‘logics
of racism,’’ a debasing (‘‘inequality-based’’) racism, on the one hand, which seems to be confined to the
legitimization of economic and social inequalities, and a differentiating (‘‘difference-based’’) racism, on
the other, which relies on a mystical positing of differences beyond such discourses of legitimization (see
Wieviorka 2005, pp. 42–45), is not tenable in regards to inferiorization’s potential violence. Following
Levinas, in contrast, one could say that all violence, hence also merely exclusive violence, is always ‘‘at
the limit of murder’’ (Levinas 2007, p. 225).
52 Sartre (1976b, p. 104).
53 Du Bois (2007, pp. 8–9); he also speaks about a ‘‘double self’’ as well as a ‘‘double life’’ (ibid., p. 136).
54 Hund (2007, pp. 88–89).
55 This expression can be found in Sartre’s analysis of the colonial system in his Critique of Dialectical
Reason (Sartre 1976a, pp. 715–717); on the thereby mentioned ‘‘system of violence,’’ see de Warren
(2004, pp. 47–49).
56 On the here mentioned genealogy of National Socialism, see the decisive analysis by Traverso (2003).
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to her. I look. I do not see whatever terrible thing she is seeing on the seat
between us—probably a roach. But she has communicated her horror to me. It
must be something very bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my snowsuit
closer to me away from it, too. When I look up the woman is still staring at
me, her nose holes and eyes huge. And suddenly I realise there is nothing
crawling up the seat between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch.
The fur brushes my face as she stands with a shudder and holds on to a strap in
the speeding train. Born and bred a New York City child, I quickly slide over
to make room for my mother to sit down. No word has been spoken. I’m afraid
to say anything to my mother because I don’t know what I have done. I look at
the side of my snow pants secretly. Is there something on them? Something’s
going on here I do not understand, but I will never forget it. Her eyes. The
flared nostrils. The hate.57
In this description of an intercorporeal encounter, the above mentioned methods
of racism can be found again. Moreover, it exhibits with particular clarity how
interpersonal encounters unfold in a medium of ‘‘interkinesthetic affectivity,’’58 a
dimension of lateral sense-formation that is rarely accounted for in mainstream
social theory as well as in philosophy.
This becomes clear, first, with regard to the experience of inferiorization through
the attribution of difference, which, in this case, occurs through the ‘‘misperception
of a phobic object.’’59 It is Audre herself who becomes this object—she experiences
being the disgusting cause of the hatred that she meets in the other’s gaze. Second,
this leads to the experience of self-alienation, an experience, in this case, of an ‘‘I
can not,’’ which influences the lived ‘‘organization of social and bodily space.’’
Since in this experience, the social space itself undergoes a change and is even
affectively reconstituted, practices of desocialization come to the fore, which take
shape in the ‘‘expulsion of Blackness from white social space’’ and correlatively in a
‘‘re-forming [of] the apartness of the white body.’’60 Thereby, a stigmatizing mode
of embodiment gains ground. For the affective over-determination of the encounter,
which is described as unforgettable, does not merely call into question the ways
Audre inhabits the lived space and coincides with the ‘‘ease of movement’’ of her
body. Rather, it interferes with the body schema, by creating ‘‘disoriented bodies’’
the movement of which becomes a ‘‘defensive posture’’ in the social space, which is
geared at avoiding ‘‘social stress’’—and precisely thereby reproduces that same
affective racist economy, which signalizes its exclusion from this space.
Summing up, I want to emphasize clearly once again that the ‘‘racialization’’ of
identities through the said methods functions on two planes. Not only does it
concern the discursive status of the subject in public, where it is rendered quasi
‘‘invisible’’ as a social agent,61 in order to secure thereby the normalizing
57 Lorde (1984, pp. 147–148). Concerning the discussion of this passage I rely on various insights
provided by Ahmed (2004).
58 On this concept see Behnke (2008).
59 Ahmed (2004, p. 33).
60 Ibid.
61 See on this, in more detail, Bernasconi (2000).
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‘‘invisibility’’ of the dominant identity-formation. Further, it bears especially on the
manner of bodily self-experience of the subject. As a result of the subject’s
stigmatizing embodiment, its self-experience is haunted by ‘‘difficulties in the
development of [the] bodily schema,’’62 whilst our ‘‘I can’’ is usually, to put it with
Sartre, ‘‘the neglected, ‘passed by in silence.’’’63 The ‘‘historical-racist schema,’’
that comes to overlay the body schema,64 thus produces a habitus that seems to carry
the stigma of difference, which is mediated discursively, always already inscribed
into it: Regardless of whether this difference is taken up affirmatively and thus
performatively reproduced, or whether it is discarded as objectively non-existing, to
be evoked as an even more dangerous, for invisible danger—as difference, it is
powerfully reflected in the amputated body schema, as Fanon describes it, or in the
‘‘inner overdetermination’’ of the actions of the racially dominated, to which Sartre
refers in his ‘‘Anti-Semite and Jew.’’65
In a nutshell, in light of the examples mentioned, racism can be grasped as the
bodily inferiorization of the other which practices a` la limite the Other’s
desocialization. Its ‘‘social sense’’ consists, besides, in imagining community
and creating individual identity-offers, which pretend to transcend the contin-
gency of factual forms of subjectivity, whilst effectively securing given power
relations.
4 Conclusion
Current research has often underlined the structural character of racism, which, as it
seems, can be abolished neither through a social critique nor through the intensified
combat against ideological forms of prejudices and discriminations. In this context,
Winant speaks of a ‘‘common-sense […] feature of everyday life and global social
structure.’’66 From a structural–functional perspective, Hund emphasizes its
integrating ‘‘function in the process of class-specific socialization.’’67 Goldberg
makes the simple and disillusioned statement: ‘‘Race is irrelevant, but all is race.’’
Even if all ‘‘racist ideologies’’ could be abolished, racism, it follows, would by no
means be disposed of once and for all. It appears to be an irreducible phenomenon
of ‘‘negative sociality’’ as it settles into pre-reflectively lived schemata of
perceptions, permeates the subjective system of relevance, and enters into the
micro-practices of interaction (such as the posture or the gaze), in the daily
reactivation of which it is tacitly reproduced.
62 Fanon (1986, p. 110).
63 Sartre (2000, p. 330). It is worth recalling the important context of this insight: ‘‘In short,
consciousness (of) the body is lateral and retrospective; the body is the neglected, the ‘passed by in
silence.’ And yet the body is what this consciousness is; it is not even anything except body. The rest is
nothingness and silence.’’ (Ibid.).
64 Fanon (1986, p. 112).
65 Sartre (1976b, p. 95).
66 Winant (2001, p. 308).
67 Hund (2007, pp. 120–121).
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Of course, we could picture the social transformation of these practices. Yet, the
question remains to which level these practices effectively reach. In this context, I
have in mind not only the institutionalized or systemic forms, in shape of which a
‘‘racism against one’s will’’68 characterizes also those societies in which but very
few would explicitly understand or define themselves as racist and where, in
contrast, the irrelevance of racializing identifications seems to prevail. Rather, I am
thinking of the humanistic universalism, which demands the abolishment of such
particularizing identifications and which, in doing so, fixes the selective normativity
of its position, i.e., fixes the way the other is to appear in a world in which I do not
need to thematize my identity precisely because it is an invisible norm.69 And
finally, I have in mind in particular the ‘‘institutional desire for good practice,’’
which almost teleologically glorifies the ‘‘social promise of diversity,’’ with the
result that ‘‘the desire for signs of resistance’’ changes all too rapidly into a
‘‘resistance to understanding racism as an ongoing and unfinished history.’’70
To conclude, the performative magic of racism is not only embedded into the
meaningful constitution of the social world, i.e., into the ‘‘‘normal’ societal
functioning.’’71 It finally returns in a ‘‘dialectics of equality and alterity’’ that haunts
all our necessary attempts of a ‘‘comparison of the incomparable.’’72 Insofar as the
desire for identity and thus the identification of the Other is constitutive for this
constitution,73 racism structurally inhabits it. As Levinas ‘demonstrated,’ ‘‘it is
[indeed] obvious that it is in the knowledge of the other as a simple individual—the
individual of a genus, a class, or a race—that peace with the other changes into
hatred; it is the approach to the other as a ‘kind of this or that.’’’74 This reflection is
important, but fails to provide us with an adequate demonstration of the reasons of
such hate. From a phenomenological point of view, such hatred can be shown to be
ignited by our anxiety to lose our grip on the other (in order to enable her to appear
in her likeness) as well as the unsettling experience that we ourselves might not fit
the norm of this ‘‘us’’. To show this, however, would be the task of another study.
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